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1 Introduction
This financial crisis is no ordinary crisis. Its
origin, depth and severity and the speed with
which it has spread around the globe are likely to
lead to profound changes in the way that
policymakers throughout the world think about
development policy. The articles in this IDS
Bulletin have focused on what we know about the
impact of the crisis on developing countries. In
this conclusion, we take the opportunity to
speculate more broadly about the potential effect
of the crisis on the face of development as we
know it. We start by asking, What is new and
different about this crisis that may make this
crisis qualitatively different from previous
downturns and recessions? We then explore the
major institutional and policy shifts that may
result from this crisis, as well as the likelihood of
major changes to policies on social protection
and low-carbon growth. We conclude with our
own assessment of the likely outcome and some
pointers to the appropriate focus for future
research.
2 What is different about this crisis?
This is not the first recession which the world
has seen, nor will it be the last. All countries’
economies are subject to business cycles – the US
economy, for example, has experienced 32
recessions since 1854; 11 since World War II.1 We
suggest three factors that make this recession
qualitatively different in its impact on
developing countries from previous downturns.
First, this crisis started in the rich world. Almost
all of the major crises which have affected
developing countries in the last 20 years have
originated in developing countries themselves
(e.g. Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s;
Mexico 1994; East Asia 1998; Russia 1998; Brazil
1999; Argentina 2000). Their impact has
therefore been severe, but localised to the
country affected or a group of closely linked
economies. By contrast, this crisis, because it
originated in the world’s largest economy, will
have a much broader and deeper impact.
Second, precisely because this is first and
foremost a financial crisis, it has spread rapidly
around the entire globe. For the first time since
World War II, almost all of the major world
economies are contracting simultaneously. This
makes its impact on small developing countries
much more severe, since there are no alternative
markets to which their exports can easily be
directed.
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Third, and crucially, the size of the shock is huge.
Industrial production has plummeted and several
countries are experiencing double digit
reductions in their GDP. The sheer size of the
recessions experienced and their rapid
transmission around the world ensure that the
crash of 2008 will, without question, be the
largest financial and economic crisis since 1929.
3 A new development paradigm?
A shock of the magnitude of the current crisis
will have effects which long outlast the
immediate economic impact. We sketch out some
of the changes which may happen and their
wider implications for development.
3.1 A new era for global economic governance?
The crisis has demonstrated the extraordinarily
high level of interdependence of economies
around the globe. This has placed in sharp relief
the inadequacy of today’s international
institutions to identify and respond to the crisis.
The failings are manifold.
First, as has been discussed extensively elsewhere
(Brunnermeier et al. 2009), there is a lack of
international financial regulation and institutions
capable of monitoring and enforcing such
regulations. The weaknesses of relying on national
financial regulators to deal with global financial
markets have been only too apparent in the
current crisis. The crisis has already led to
measures to strengthen cross-country
collaboration between financial regulators; much
tighter restrictions on tax havens, and the
inclusion of hedge funds and other systemically
significant entities into the remit of supervisors. It
will almost certainly result in the abandonment of
the Basle II reliance on individual firm risk
models for assessing risk, and the implementation
of broader forms of macro-prudential supervision.
Second, the urgent need to broaden
representation in the institutions of global
economic governance is apparent. The crisis has
resulted in a high profile process of institutional
outreach to emerging powers through the G20
forum rather than the traditional G7/8 forum.
More broadly, the crisis has brought open
recognition that we live in a multipolar rather
than a unipolar world. This may lead to a greater
emphasis on multilateralism, on new alliances
and changes in the balance of global power,
particularly through a greater role for major
emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India
and, particularly, China, in the governance of
global institutions. However, although this
broadening of representation in global fora
includes ‘systemically significant’ developing
countries, it still excludes the voices of almost all
African countries and the large majority of
developing nations. At present, there seems little
prospect of this changing, which may damage the
perceived legitimacy of those institutions in the
rest of the developing world.
Third, current global economic institutions lack
the funds and the ways of operating which are
needed to respond to a crisis of this kind. The
G20 summit in April 2009 saw significant
increases in the resources of the IMF and the
World Bank, as well as steps to improve the
flexibility and speed with which resources can be
used (G20 2009). Whether these increases in
resources and new instruments will be sufficient
to meet the needs of their many clients remains
to be seen. Past performance does not give much
cause for optimism (Gottschalk and Bolton, this
IDS Bulletin).
But the reforms needed in these institutions go
far beyond additional resources.2 The reality is
that the IMF in particular is not seen by many
developing countries as their institution working
on their behalf, but rather as a Western
institution, which imposes unwelcome policy
prescriptions upon countries facing economic
crisis. It is noteworthy that, when Pakistan
needed a loan, it turned (unsuccessfully) to China
before the IMF. Most countries still do all they
can to avoid the stigma of borrowing from the
IMF. To be effective as a form of international
insurance against macroeconomic shocks, the
IMF must shift from a ‘Poor Law’ model to an
‘insurance’ model. In the former, a country must
exhaust all other options and then suffer the
shame and stigma of receiving IMF support. As a
result, responsible governments in need of
support do everything they can to avoid it, while
irresponsible governments promise adherence to
conditions in order to obtain support that they
should not receive. An insurance model, by
contrast, would provide support by right when a
pre-agreed set of circumstances arise, but not
when the conditions of the insurance are violated.
Two key changes need to be made to achieve such
a change. First, there needs to be a dramatic
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restructuring of the voting structure of the IMF.
Because the USA continues to hold 17 per cent of
the votes, it has an effective veto on all key votes
(since the quorum is 85 per cent). The current
proposals for voting reform make minor
adjustments, but fail to even begin to create a
voting structure which would give developing
countries serious ownership of the institution (e.g.
even after the proposed reforms Belgium’s voting
share will be larger than Brazil’s) (The Economist
2009). Second, it should be possible for the IMF
and the World Bank to be led by someone from
the developing world. The G20 summit saw the
reiteration of the desire to see the heads of both
institutions selected on merit, but the timetable
set for agreeing such reforms is lamentably slow.
Aside from the reform of the Bretton Woods
institutions, the Commission of Experts of the
President of the General Assembly of the UN has
called for the creation of an independent panel of
experts to advise the General Assembly and the
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC,
modelled along the lines of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change), as well as a Global
Economic Coordination Council of similar
standing to the current Security Council (UN
2009). Whether these recommendations will be
taken up is unclear at present. However, the
difficulty in achieving international agreement on
important structural changes in the systems of
global economic governance is illustrated by the
postponement of the UN Conference on the World
Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on
Development due to strong disagreements about
the text of the draft agreement.
In summary, the crisis has opened the world’s
eyes to the systemic significance of large
developing countries and the interdependence of
all. It is likely to boost the representation and
power of a handful of large developing nations.
At the same time, current proposals suggest that
there will not be major changes to the ways in
which the World Bank and the IMF operate.
Moreover, despite a symbolic widening to the
G20, some of the most important strategic issues
appear to be narrowing to a G2 consisting of the
USA and China.
3.2 A new approach to development policy?
The reductions in poverty that have happened
over the last 20 years have largely been fuelled by
export-led growth. Yet in a global recession, this
past engine is an unlikely route for recovery. It is
also clear that more open countries have been the
most vulnerable to economic downturn in this
crisis (see Robinson and Willenbockel, this IDS
Bulletin). As a result, analysts and policymakers
across the world are questioning the effectiveness
of global integration as a pathway towards
prosperity. The next decade could see a repeat of
the de-globalisation experienced in the early
twentieth century, including restrictions on the
international movement of capital and greater
protectionism (Williamson and O’Rourke 2001).
Such a change could be disastrous for global
growth and poverty reduction. For this reason,
G20 leaders have been at pains to emphasise the
importance of keeping borders open. But in
practice, protectionist measures have been
increasing and there is little sign of an early
conclusion of the Doha round of trade talks.
In fact, the reappraisal of the role of
international integration for development is part
of an intellectual shift that was already
happening prior to the crisis. The importance of
the relationship between openness and growth
has been strongly contested in the literature
(Rodrik et al. 2004), although there is no
convincing evidence that being closed is good for
growth either (Rodriguez and Rodrik 1999).
Rodrik in particular has argued strongly that
developing countries need to be allowed the
policy space to re-think their interactions with
global markets (Rodrik 2008).
More broadly, IDS’s work on crisis narratives
suggests that developing country policymakers
may have less respect for, and less interest in,
policy prescriptions from the West (Schmidt et al.,
this IDS Bulletin). In particular, many countries
are looking East for new models of development.
Cook and Gu, in this IDS Bulletin show the need
for greater understanding of China’s evolving
role in development, as many countries begin to
see China’s approach as an alternative to the
Washington Consensus model of development.
The influence of China’s state-driven approach,
as well as the huge state interventions
undertaken by Western governments during the
last year, are likely to legitimise a greater role for
the state in the economy in the minds of many
developing country policymakers. Similarly, the
trend towards tighter financial regulation may
well be mirrored in a general tendency for
increased government regulation of the economy.
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The final outcome of such a shift in the
intellectual climate will not be known for some
years. Whether these shifts are positive or
negative, depends on how policy responses tackle
today’s problems and learn from the lessons of
the past. A greater tendency for developing
countries to explore new development models
and to rely on their own analysis and knowledge
to fashion solutions to the problems they face,
could be a positive outcome of the crisis.
Similarly, it may be desirable for developing
countries to be given greater flexibility within
international agreements to implement policies
that they feel are appropriate for their situation.
The principle concern is that policies which may
have been effective, will be discredited along
with those that have not worked. For example,
international integration has been strongly
beneficial for many countries – an ideological
shift towards ‘internally’ generated growth may
threaten these gains. Similarly private sector
competition has often improved efficiency in
formerly state-owned sectors – a return to high
levels of state ownership in industry may not
boost growth. The best outcome will neither be a
return to the Washington Consensus, nor the
abandonment of it, but rather a new pragmatic
consensus, in which policy is based on the
analysis of the best available evidence for each
country’s unique context.
3.3 A new opportunity to protect the poor
Moments of crisis also present windows of
opportunity. Just as the depression in 1930s USA
gave birth to the New Deal, there has been much
talk of a Global New Deal. One way to make this
a reality would be to take this opportunity to
institutionalise social protection in sub-Saharan
Africa.
The last ten years have seen extensive
development of social protection in Africa. The
largest programmes are in Ethiopia and South
Africa, but pilots, some large, are emerging in
Kenya, Zambia and Ghana. Moreover, there is a
lot more evidence now about what sorts of
programmes are most effective and how to target
and improve the livelihoods of different groups.
However, it remains the case that few of these
schemes are long-term or at scale. The vast
majority of the most vulnerable people in the
world’s most vulnerable continent still lack
effective, systematic social protection (Ellis et al.
2009).
There is a danger that the crisis may not change
the level of social protection in practice if we do
not make the rhetoric reality but if voice is
improved – people are aware of their
entitlements and can claim them – we could
move forward. Key to changing this is the
generation of greater demand for and ownership
of social protection programmes by both African
governments and their citizens. For example,
Brown et al. (2009) show that a key reason for the
success of the large-scale social protection
programme in Ethiopia is local ownership. The
Ethiopian government was keen to change its
international image as a famine-ridden, hopeless
country. Further, providing social protection was
much cheaper than emergency aid, while the
‘productive’ aspect of the safety net helped to
justify the resources devoted to the programme
because the poor worked for their money. Social
protection, therefore, proved to be timely,
predictable and adequate, and, unlike emergency
aid, is available before the poor lose their assets
due to a shock.
However, there are many impediments to
broader provision of social protection. These
include the radical shift that it can require in
ways of doing things, as well as limited capacity
for implementation in some countries. Thus,
despite more commitment and additional
resources, most social protection in sub-Saharan
Africa is still donor-driven. Much more needs to
be known about the key political processes of
policy formation and implementation and how to
build effective demand for greater social
protection. It will be important to learn lessons
from those countries in both Asia and Latin
America, where local ownership of social
protection by governments is real.
To what extent will the crisis help to create
momentum for much greater social protection in
Africa? The evidence to date is mixed. On the one
hand, there has been much discussion, globally, of
the need for greater social protection. The
President of the World Bank called for 0.7 per
cent of developed country stimulus packages to be
devoted to supporting developing countries, with
social protection featuring strongly in this support
(Zoellick 2009). Similarly, the UN Commission of
Experts recommended that 1 per cent of such
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packages be devoted to this purpose. The crisis
has also led to the UN proposal for a ‘social
protection floor’ and to the World Bank’s
Vulnerability Financing Facility (VFF) including
the Global Food Crisis Response Program and the
new Rapid Social Response Program, which will
help to create new global partnerships to share
experience, evidence and ideas on how to
effectively extend social protection (see also
Davies and McGregor, this IDS Bulletin).
But it is not clear how much this increase in
rhetoric will translate into concrete action at the
country level. Even the additional resources are
not what they seem at first glance. The VFF is an
umbrella for a set of World Bank initiatives,
several of which are not new, and not all of the
new donor resources announced for social
protection have proved to be new funds. More
fundamentally, if the advocates for greater
spending on social protection at the country level
consist only of donors, then this could be self-
defeating as the lack of local ownership by
national governments will likely mean
programmes which are less sustainable after the
crisis. There is also a tension between putting in
place emergency response measures, and
introducing or broadening longer-term social
protection programmes to address the structural
vulnerabilities faced by the poor in each country.
It is important that these are seen as
complements rather than substitutes in
responding to the crisis.
Perhaps most difficult of all is attempting to
broaden social protection within an extremely
constrained fiscal environment. Many African
countries, far from being able to provide a
stimulus, are likely to be looking for expenditure
cuts to maintain macroeconomic stability in an
environment of declining revenues. Expanding
social protection therefore entails even larger cuts
in other forms of expenditure. There is therefore
an important link between the potential of the
crisis for expanding social protection and the need
for countries to be provided with flexible forms of
official financing to cushion the budgetary impact
of the crisis (Gottschalk and Bolton, this IDS
Bulletin). In short, the crisis may increase the
leverage of advocates of social protection in
developing countries, but in many countries, their
success will depend on whether donors are able to
support sufficient fiscal space for the budget
reallocations involved.
3.4 A new commitment to a low-carbon future
The large coordinated fiscal stimulus being
undertaken by rich countries in response to the
crisis presents a major opportunity to achieve a
step-change to a lower carbon growth path. The
potential damage that global warming may cause
is immense. The costs of significantly slowing
down the process are small in comparison – and
similar to the size of the fiscal stimulus being
undertaken to address the crisis. There is
therefore a strategic opportunity to use a part of
the stimulus to promote a shift to lower carbon
technologies. To be effective, this will require the
participation of major developing countries. This
will depend on finding accountable forms of
international environmental governance, which
strike the right balance between the
responsibility of all to reduce the harm to future
generations and the right of all to development.
However, one of the difficulties in using the
opportunity of the crisis to build commitment for
low-carbon development, is that there are several
different interpretations of what low carbon
development means. Table 1 gives four
contrasting interpretations, resulting from
where policymakers place themselves on two
different dimensions of response: their approach
to growth; and their focus on production or
consumption related policy measures. The first
two types of low carbon development (Green
economy and Green lifestyles) assume that
economic growth is compatible with significant
reductions in carbon emissions – the latter two
(Equilibrium economy and Coexistence with
nature) assume it is not. The Green economy
and Equilibrium economy approaches both put
the emphasis on reducing the production of
carbon through technological changes, while the
Green lifestyles and Coexistence with nature
approaches focus on reducing demand through
lifestyle and behavioural changes.
The options presented in Table 1, of course, are
not all mutually exclusive. For example, most
country policymakers will favour a mix of
production- and consumption-side approaches to
low carbon development. However, the debate
about the appropriate mix of policy measures in
each country is still ongoing. As a result, there is
little consensus within the governments of major
emitters about what a green stimulus should be
spent on.
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At the same time, governments providing a fiscal
stimulus have been under strong political
pressure to implement such measures as quickly
as possible, and to protect or create as many jobs
as possible in the process. This has given an
inevitable bias towards projects which are in a
position to spend money quickly and likely to
employ large numbers of people. Both of these
factors can mitigate against long-term
investment in ‘green’ infrastructure. It remains
to be seen, therefore, whether the fiscal stimulae
being undertaken will live up to their potential
as a means of creating a step-change in low-
carbon development.
4 Conclusions
We conclude with notes of both optimism and
pessimism.
On the optimistic side, it seems likely that this
crisis will result in much greater activism by
developing countries in the design and
implementation of their own development
policies. The Washington Consensus was already
under siege before the crisis – it is now dead – at
least in the sense that Western policy
prescriptions are perceived by many developing
country policymakers as having been completely
discredited by this crisis. The hope is that we will
see the emergence of development policies which
are much more context- and country-sensitive as
a result.
There also appears to be a significant shift
towards greater engagement of development
country policymakers in the discussion and
formulation of policies for international economic
cooperation. However, our optimism is tempered
here. The geopolitical shift that we observe
results in the inclusion of systemically significant
developing countries – but the vast majority are
still likely to be left out. Moreover, the shifts in
the governance of the International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) seem, although large by the
standards of a year ago, to do very little to alter
the status quo of power in those institutions.
Unfortunately, there is also much to be
pessimistic about. For all the rhetoric about the
need to protect the vulnerable, the opportunity
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Table 1 Types of low carbon development
Type of low carbon development Focus Approach
Green economy
This approach focuses on the production-side of an economy Focus mainly on Technological change, 
and on how goods and services can be produced with lower mitigation, although sectoral change
emissions. It aims at decoupling economic growth from adaptation also plays 
carbon emissions (e.g. halving emissions, but doubling GDP). a role
Green lifestyles
This approach focuses on the consumption-side of a growing Focus equally on Behavioural changes, 
economy and on the consumer‘s ability to reduce emissions mitigation and sectoral change, 
by consuming climate-friendly products. It implies lifestyle adaptation technological change
changes and behavioural changes and also leads to a 
decoupling of carbon emissions (e.g. halving emissions, but 
doubling GDP).
Equilibrium economy
This approach focuses on the production-side of an economy Focus mainly on Technological change, 
and aims at development rather than growth. No decoupling mitigation, although sectoral change
is necessary, as growth is neutral (e.g. halving emissions, but adaptation also 
keeping GDP stable). plays a role
Coexistence with nature
This approach focuses on the consumption-side of an economy Focus equally on Behavioural change, 
and aims at development rather than growth. No decoupling mitigation and sectoral change, 
is necessary as growth is neutral (e.g. halving emissions, but adaptation technological change
keeping GDP stable).
Source Urban and Sumner (2009).
to institutionalise broader and effective social
protection, particularly in Africa, seems likely to
be missed. Similarly, the Green New Deal may
amount to much less than hoped, in part because
countries are still attempting to negotiate the
size and nature of the commitments that they
intend to make in Copenhagen in December.
There is also significant concern about the impact
of the crisis on the long-term development
prospects of some of the world’s poorest countries.
In particular, the extensive debt relief offered to
many of the poorest countries in 2005 and 2006
may simply have given space for the build up of
more debt, as governments struggle to reign in
expenditures. The financial crisis of 2008/09 may
beget a debt crisis a few years down the line in
sovereign debt (Ladd 2009).
At the same time, it is perhaps a source of relief
that the poorest countries are, in general, not
those hardest hit by the current crisis. Rather
the economies that are suffering most in the
short-term, are the export-oriented and
increasingly high-tech economies that have
gained most so far from globalisation (notably
those in Asia), as well as those heavily dependent
on the export of oil. But this is hardly good news.
The growth reversals of some of these countries
have been catastrophic, shaking faith in the
export oriented development model that has
been pursued. There has been much talk of a
shift to ‘internally’ generated growth. This may
well make sense for China or India with huge
domestic markets, but is completely impossible
for the vast majority of small developing
economies.
The global financial crisis may change the
development paradigm – but it is most likely to
do so through its impact on the attitudes of
developing country policymakers towards the
prevailing policy prescriptions, rather than
through major structural changes in global
economic governance. Unfortunately, we will not
know the significance of the changes that do
occur, for some time. This has important
implications for the research agenda going
forward. To date, most work on the crisis
(including this IDS Bulletin) has focused on
assessing the likely impact, and prescribing
suitable immediate policy responses. The next
major research agenda should be to describe
what actually happened and to understand why
and to prescribe more medium- and longer-term
policy responses. This may not help respond to
the current crisis, but it could point towards
policies that would increase the resilience of
developing countries to the future crises that will
occur. In the meantime, the optimists believe
that we will return to business-as-usual very soon
– and the pessimists believe that they are right.
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Notes
1 See: www.nber.org/cycles.html
2 There is substantial literature on reform of
the World Bank and the IMF – see, e.g. the
Global Economic Governance programme at
the University of Oxford
(www.globaleconomicgovernance.org); the
Centre for Global Development in
Washington DC (www.cgdev.org); the
Overseas Development Institute in the UK
(www.odi.org.uk) and the selection of articles
on VoxEU (www.voxeu.org).
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